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INTRODUCTION 
Seller argues that its premature notice of forfeiture made "no 
difference" to Buyer, and therefore did not violate the strict 
compliance rule, because the jury could have "inferred" from the 
evidence that even if Seller had given Buyer its full 30 days to 
cure, Buyer would not have paid in the last two days. 
Seller's argument, in effect, requires this Court to replace 
the "strict compliance" rule with a "substantial compliance" rule, 
because it treats the last two days of the cure period as being 
unimportant. In determining whether a forfeiture is valid, 
however, the law should treat the last two days of a cure period as 
being extremely important—more important than the preceding 28 
days. The law should recognize that many people, when faced with 
a deadline, wait until the last day to perform the required act. 
Therefore, it would be unfair for a seller to have the right to 
unilaterally cut short the cure period by even one day. 
Moreover, the inference that Seller argues the jury could have 
drawn from the evidence is speculative. There was no direct 
testimony at trial from any of Buyer's representatives, including 
Mr. Busch, as to what Buyer would have done if the notice of 
forfeiture had not been two days premature. Although Mr. Busch did 
testify as to why he did not pay the second annual installment 
(i.e., his dispute with Mr. Siggard over the perimeter boundary 
survey, etc.), such testimony was in the context of what actually 
happened - Seller's premature delivery of the notice of forfeiture. 
For the jury to conclude that, if Mr. Busch had been given the full 
30 days to cure, he still would not have paid, requires the jury to 
speculate as to what Mr. Busch would have done under a different 
set of circumstances. 
The law should not permit a jury or a judge to speculate as to 
whether a buyer would have cured its default in the final days of 
the cure period. Even if a buyer told a seller, "I absolutely will 
not cure my default," the law should allow for the very real 
possibility that, because a buyer stands to lose its equity, the 
buyer might change its mind and cure on the last day. 
In the instant case, Buyer invested over $200,000 of its own 
money in obtaining commercial zoning for the property (Tr. 134:10-
25, 135:1) and thereby increased the property's value at least 
four-fold . For Buyer to simply walk away from this investment 
would have been utterly foolish. Never did Mr. Busch or any of 
Buyer's representatives testify that Buyer did not intend to pay, 
did not want to pay, or would not have paid the second annual 
installment had Buyer been given its full opportunity to cure the 
default. As a matter of law, Seller should not be permitted to cut 
short by two days Buyer's opportunity to cure and thereby save its 
investment based solely on the jury's speculation that Buyer would 
not have made the payment in the last two days. 
Seller also argues that, by this appeal, Buyer seeks relief 
that is indistinguishable from the remedy of specific performance, 
which the jury rejected. To the contrary, the relief that Buyer 
Prior to commercial zoning being approved by Sandy City, the 
property had a value of $25,000 per acre. (Tr. 378:24-25, 379:1-9; 
cf. Tr. 434:11-25, 435:1-3.) After commercial zoning was approved, 
the property's value increased to between $98,000 and $180,000 per 
acre. (Tr. 313:17-20, 632:24-25.) 
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seeks is very different than specific performance. In requesting 
specific performance (Buyer's first theory at trial), Buyer was 
asking the court to (1) determine that Seller breached the contract 
and (2) order Seller to perform it duties under the contract (such 
as providing a survey) before Buyer would be required to make any 
more payments thereunder. 
In this appeal, Buyer concedes that Buyer, not Seller, 
breached the contract. But even given Buyer's breach, Seller is 
not entitled to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract without 
complying with the forfeiture provisions of the contract (Buyer's 
second theory at trial). In other words, Buyer is asking this 
Court to determine that Seller failed to forfeit Buyer's interest 
under the contract and that Seller cannot do so until it gives 
Buyer its full opportunity to cure. If this Court rules in Buyer's 
favor, Buyer would be required to make all payments required by the 
contract without regard to the Seller's conduct. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF PACTS" 
In arguing that Buyer did not intend to pay and therefore 
would not have paid in the last two days, Seller makes several 
factual assertions that are either mischaracterizations of the 
evidence or improper speculation as to what Buyer would have done. 
A. Buyer's Payment of the First Annual Installment 
In arguing that Buyer would not have paid the second annual 
installment of $56,000, one of the factual assertions Seller relies 
on is that Buyer failed to meet its obligation with regard to the 
first annual installment. (Appellees' Brief at 7-8.) Seller 
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asserts, "In March, 1989, when the very first payment was overdue, 
[Seller] had to provide [Buyer] with a Notice of Default before 
[Buyer] ultimately paid the first delinquent payment." (Appellees' 
Brief at 26 (emphasis added).) In support of this factual 
assertion, Seller cites to Trial Exhibit 16, which is Seller's 
March 1989 notice of default to Buyer (see Appellees' Brief at 8), 
and also cites to Tr. 396:13-25, 397:1-13, & 399:8-17 (see 
Appellees' Brief at 7-8, 26). 
Seller's characterization of the first annual payment as 
"delinquent" and "overdue" is false. Under the terms of the 
purchase contract, no payment was due by Buyer as of March 3, 1989, 
because at that time the contract was void. Paragraph 16 of the 
contract provides: 
Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall 
apply for commercial zoning on the Property to build a 
commercial center thereon. However, should Buyer fail, 
with or without cause, to obtain such commercial zoning 
prior to March 3, 1989, then the Contract shall be void 
and the Down payment refunded to Buyer. [Trial Exhibit 
7; Addendum to Appellant's Brief, page 4; Addendum B to 
Appellee's Brief, page 4 (emphasis added).] 
At trial, both Mr. Siggard and Mr. Busch testified that commercial 
zoning was not obtained until August 1989. (Tr. 133:13-19, 151:5-
25, 403:15-25, 404:1-2.) It follows that the contract was void 
when the first payment fell due. 
After March 3, 1989, but prior to the Buyer's obtaining 
commercial zoning, the parties negotiated and executed an amendment 
to the contract which deleted paragraph 16 and reinstated the 
contract. (Trial Exhibit 17; Tr. 147-150, 398-401.) At that time, 
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Buyer paid a negotiated payment of $56,000. (Tr. 149:6-8; 399-
400.) 
The March 1989 notice of default, which Seller relies on, 
contradicts rather than supports Seller's factual assertion. This 
notice states that Buyer is in "default" under "section sixteen on 
[sic] the contract" (which, as just discussed, deals with 
commercial zoning). This notice does not say the first annual 
installment is due or overdue; indeed, it makes no mention 
whatsoever of the first annual installment. (Trial Exhibit 16; 
Addendum C to Appellees' Brief.) 
The transcript pages cited by Seller also do not support 
Seller7s factual assertion. In those pages, Mr. Siggard testifies 
that he did not receive a payment on March 3, 1989, and that 
thereafter he sent a notice of default to Buyer. (Tr. 396:13-25, 
397:1-13.) Nowhere in those pages does Mr. Siggard state that the 
first annual installment was delinquent or overdue on March 3, 
1989.2 
B. Buyer's Understanding of the Notice of Forfeiture 
Another important factual assertion urged on this Court by 
Seller is that, despite the unambiguous language of the notice of 
forfeiture, Buyer understood it had not yet forfeited its rights. 
In its brief, Seller states, "Notwithstanding [the premature notice 
of forfeiture], [Buyer] understood that it had two days remaining 
2 . 
In questioning Mr. Siggard, Mr. Siggard's attorney asserts, 
"On March 3rd of 1989 a payment under the contract was due." (Tr. 
396:14-15.) However, it is axiomatic that Mr. Siggard's attorney 
is not permitted to testify on behalf of Mr. Siggard. 
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before [Buyer] would forfeit any rights under the Contract." 
(Appellees7 Brief at 12.) According to Seller, the notice of 
forfeiture "did not preclude [Buyer] from attempting to cure its 
breach;" Buyer could have cured its default in the two days 
remaining in the cure period "if [Buyer] had chosen to." 
(Appellees' Brief at 26, 33.) 
These factual assertions are all based a one-sentence response 
by Mr. Robert Busch to a question by Seller's attorney: 
Q Okay. In that two-day period, from April 3rd 
to April 5th, did you pay $56,000 to Don and Glenna 
Siggard? 
A No, but I could have. 
(Tr. 252:7-10 (emphasis added).) Seller interprets the words, "but 
I could have" to mean, "I understood that, notwithstanding the 
notice of forfeiture, I had the legal right to pay," rather than 
the obvious meaning, "I was financially capable of paying." 
Seller's interpretation of the phrase, "but I could have" is 
contradicted by the evidence. Seller's notice of forfeiture leaves 
no doubt that upon Buyer's receipt of the notice, Seller is 
treating the contract as being terminated. It states, "[Buyer's] 
receipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to the 
original contract." (Trial Exhibit 21; Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief, page 17; Addendum G to Appellees' Brief (emphasis added).) 
Nowhere in the transcript did Mr. Busch testify that because 
Seller's notice of forfeiture was premature, he understood the 
notice as anything other than its face value indicated. To the 
contrary, he testified that when he received the notice, he was 
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shocked: "I had flames come out of my ears . . . . I just couldn't 
believe that that would happen." (Tr. 165:16-18.) To protect 
himself from what he viewed as an "illegal forfeiture" (Tr. 166:21-
25), Mr. Busch immediately filed a notice of interest against the 
property and had his attorney send a letter notifying Mr. Siggard 
that the notice was two days early. (Tr. 165-167.) 
The only reasonable interpretation of Mr. Busch7s statement, 
"but I could have," is that had Seller given Buyer the opportunity 
to pay during the last two days of the cure period, Buyer "could 
have" paid because Buyer was financially able to do so. 
C. Buyer's Intent Regarding the Second Annual Installment 
Throughout its brief, Seller repeatedly asserts that Buyer did 
not intend to pay the second annual installment. In addition to 
relying on "inferences" from the facts, Seller also cites directly 
to the transcript in support of this assertion. Each of these 
The three places in Seller's brief where Seller cites to 
the record in support of this assertion are as follows: 
• "[I]t is clear from the evidence that [Buyer] had no 
intention of paying the $56,000 payment on March 3, 1990 
or before April 5, 1990, the end of the 30 day cure 
period. (R. 1612, Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.)" (Appellees' 
Brief at 12-13 (emphasis added).) 
• "[T]he jury received evidence that demonstrated that 
[Buyer] had no intention of paying the $56,000 payment on 
March 3, 1990 or at any time during the cure period. (R. 
1612, Tr. 167:12-25, 168:1.)" (Appellees' Brief at 25 
(emphasis added).) 
• "The evidence and the inferences the jury can draw from 
the evidence additionally demonstrate that [Buyer] did 
not want to make the annual payment (Tr. 167:22-25, 
168:1) . . . ." (Appellees' Brief at 31 (emphasis 
added).) 
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direct citations relies on the same pages of the trial transcript 
(167-68), in which Mr. Busch explained why, after receiving the 
notice of forfeiture and instructing his counsel to send a letter 
to Mr. Siggard, he did not make the $56,000 payment: 
Q At this point in time, Mr. Busch, did you ever 
make the $56,000 payment to Mr. Siggard? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever offer to make the $56,000 payment 
to Mr. Siggard at this period of time? 
A No. I didn't offer to make the $56,000 
payment. And the reason I didn't make the $56,000 
payment — 
Q Let me stop you. Why didn't you make the 
$56,000 payment? 
A I didn't make the $56,000 payment because I 
knew that [Mr. Siggard] was not going to deliver me the 
[perimeter boundary] survey and was trying to force me to 
buy ground that I wasn't going to be able to use. I felt 
we had to solve that problem before we could go any 
further. 
(Tr. 167:22-25; 168:1.) 
In this same vein, Mr. Busch testified that when the second 
annual installment fell due, "I didn't believe I owed [Siggard] the 
money because he wouldn't sell me the ground that it said under the 
contract that I had a right to buy and he wouldn't give me a 
[perimeter boundary] survey." (Tr. 257:8-11.) 
The foregoing testimony does not support Seller's unqualified 
assertion that Buyer "had no intention" of paying the second annual 
installment. This testimony shows at most that, in Mr. Busch's 
mind, he was at that time excused from making the payment (i.e., he 
didn't "owe" the money) because of a dispute between him and Mr. 
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Siggard. More important, regardless of the reason why Mr. Busch 
did not pay the second annual installment of $56,000, such non-
payment was in the context of the premature delivery by Mr. Siggard 
of the notice of forfeiture. To infer that, even if Seller had 
properly delivered the notice of forfeiture after the full cure 
period, Mr. Busch absolutely would not have paid the $56,000 during 
the last two days requires speculation. If speculation is to be 
permitted, one could also conclude that because Mr. Busch was an 
experienced developer, and because Buyer had invested so much money 
into the project, Mr. Busch might have changed his mind and decided 
to pay on the last day to protect Buyer's interest in the property. 
Of course, this too would simply be speculation. 
D. Miscellaneous Facts 
• Seller asserts that Buyer failed to meet its obligations under 
the contract by not obtaining the rezoning of the 20 acres 
before March 3, 1989. (Appellees' Brief at 7.) But failure 
to obtain zoning was not a default under the contract. 
Paragraph 16 of the contract, quoted above, voids the contract 
if zoning is not obtained, regardless of the reason ("with or 
without cause") for Buyer's failure to obtain it. 
• Speaking of the notice of default, Seller incredibly asserts 
that Buyer "knew . . . the notice was a forfeiture notice" 
(Appellees7 Brief at 24 (emphasis added), citing Tr. 164:9-
12.) On that page of the transcript, Mr. Busch was asked to 
pick up the notice of forfeiture exhibit, and mistakenly 
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picked up the notice of default exhibit. He immediately 
corrects his mistake six lines down. (See Tr. 164:13-18.) 
• Seller asserts that Buyer's April 4, 1990 letter to Siggards 
does not "state any excuse for failing to make the [second 
annual] payment." (Appellee's Brief at 26.) To the contrary, 
the letter states in the last paragraph on the first page that 
Mr. Siggard failed to provide a certified ALTA survey and 
therefore is in breach of the contract. (Trial Exhibit 23; 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief, page 21; Addendum H to 
Appellees' Brief.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Refuse to Substitute a "Substantial 
Compliance" Rule in Place of Utah's Strict Compliance Rule 
Seller characterizes its giving of the notice of forfeiture 
two days early as a mere "technical violation" of the strict 
compliance rule. (Appellees' Brief at 25.) Seller argues that its 
sending of the notice of forfeiture was merely a technical 
formality (Appellees' Brief at 24) ; that, regardless of when Seller 
received the notice of forfeiture, its purpose had already been 
served because Buyer received and understood the original notice of 
default (Appellees' Brief at 23-24, 27-31); that Buyer "had no 
intention" of making the required payment (Appellees' Brief at 12-
13, 25); and that, consequently, Buyer's premature receipt of the 
notice of forfeiture "made no difference." (Appellees' Brief, at 
24). Therefore, Seller asserts, it complied with the strict 
compliance rule; to hold otherwise would "place form over 
substance." (Appellee's Brief at 32.) 
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In effect, Seller is urging this Court to substitute a 
"substantial compliance" rule in place of the strict compliance 
rule articulated in Grow v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 
(Utah 1980) and Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987). 
Under such a rule, a seller who sends notice of forfeiture 
prematurely could be said to have "strictly complied" with the 
notice provisions of the contract if a jury or judge determines 
that the buyer would not have made the payment anyway. 
The substantial compliance rule proposed by Seller has four 
major problems: (A) It treats the sending of a notice of forfeiture 
as a mere technical formality, when in fact it is a substantive 
requirement negotiated and agreed to under the contract. (B) It 
would require this Court to overturn Grow v. Marwick and Adair v. 
Bracken. (C) It treats the final days of the cure period as being 
unimportant, when in fact they are the most critical time in the 
cure period. (D) It requires a jury or a judge to speculate as to 
whether a buyer who receives premature notice of forfeiture would 
have paid in the remaining days of the cure period. 
A. Sending a Notice of Forfeiture Is A Substantive, Not a 
Technical, Requirement 
This Court has held that sending a notice of forfeiture is not 
just a technical formality, but is an essential, substantive 
requirement. In Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849, 853 (Utah App. 
1987), this Court stated: 
A notice of forfeiture is a declaration that the 
seller is no longer just threatening to invoke this 
contractual remedy, but has in fact elected the 
forfeiture option—after the buyers' failure to cure the 
default within a reasonable time after adequate notice of 
11 
default—and has thereby terminated the buyers' 
contractual interest. . . . A notice of forfeiture leaves 
no room for speculation about the extinguishment of the 
buyers' rights in the contract. 
Although it is true in the instant case that Buyer received 
and understood the notice of default, in which Seller gave Buyer 30 
days in which to cure, it is equally true that on the 28th day 
Buyer received a notice stating unequivocally that Buyer's receipt 
of the notice released Seller of all obligations under the original 
contract, i.e., Seller was treating the contract as terminated. 
Buyer's premature receipt of the notice could mean only one thing 
4 
to Buyer: Seller had forfeited Buyer's rights two days early. 
B. This Court Should Not Overrule Grow v. Marwick or Adair 
v. Bracken 
Seller's argument, in effect, asks this Court to overrule Grow 
v. Marwick Development Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980) and Adair v. 
Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), which both require a seller 
to strictly comply with the notice provisions of the contract in 
attempting to forfeit a buyer's interest. 
Seller, of course, does not say this. Seller argues that Grow 
v. Marwick and Ada ir v. Bracken are distinguishable because in 
those cases, the buyer tendered payment while in the instant case 
buyer did not. In those cases, however, the improper notice by 
5 . 
seller led buyer into thinking it could still tender payment; in 
4 . . . 
Mr. Busch testified that Mr. Siggard "gave me 30 days [in 
which to cure the default], then forfeits me out in 28." (Tr. 
166:23-25.) 
5
 In Grow v. Marwick Development Inc. , 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1980), the improper notices led the buyer to believe "that he would 
have additional time" to make the payment. Id. at 1252. In Adair 
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the instant case, Seller's improper notice led Buyer into thinking 
it could not tender payment. To impose on a buyer the requirement 
that it tender payment after seller has unequivocally stated the 
contract is terminated would be to require the buyer to perform "a 
useless act," Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Kan. 
App. 1980), which the law does not require. 
Seller also attempts to distinguish Grow and Adair on the 
grounds that those cases deal only with notices that are 
"substantively defective in their content" (Appellees' Brief at 
31), not with cases where a notice is delivered prematurely. 
The distinction Seller attempts to draw between "content" and 
"delivery" is meaningless. The problem addressed by both Grow and 
Adair is the misleading, confusing nature of the notices. Where a 
notice of default states that a buyer has 30 days to cure, but the 
buyer receives the notice of forfeiture before the 30 days, the 
buyer would be just as misled or confused as if the content of the 
notice was improper. Grow and Adair contain no language limiting 
the strict compliance rule to content; the rule applies with just 
as much force to premature delivery of the notice of forfeiture. 
Seller cites cases from other jurisdictions to support its 
content/delivery distinction. In none of the published cases cited 
by Seller did the party claiming improper notice receive a 
v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), the improper notices led 
buyers to assume that "their continued default was being tolerated" 
and that "their contractual rights were intact." Id. at 853. 
One of the cases cited by Seller, Hill v. Johnson. 713 P.2d 
493 (Mem. Dec. Kan. 1985), is unpublished and consequently ought 
not be relied upon by this Court. 
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premature notice of forfeiture; in each of those cases, the 
deficiency in the notice was inconsequential. In any event, to 
the extent those cases support a "substantial compliance" rather 
than a "strict compliance" rule, they are at odds with Grow v. 
Marwick and Adair v. Brackenf and therefore are not persuasive 
authority. 
C The Law Should Treat the Last Few Days of the Cure Period 
As Being Critical 
In determining whether a forfeiture is valid, the law should 
treat the last few days of a cure period as being critical. The 
law should recognize that many people, when faced with a deadline, 
wait until the very last day to perform the required act. Courts 
and judges are well aware of this. For example, notices of appeal 
are frequently filed on the last day. 
In the instant case, Mr. Busch was faced with a difficult 
decision. Should he pay the second annual installment of $56,000, 
even though (in Mr. Busch,s mind) Mr. Siggard had breached the 
contract by failing to provide the perimeter boundary survey and by 
attempting to force Mr. Busch to buy more ground than he was 
In Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 620 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Kan. App. 
1980), the claimed deficiency was that the mechanic's lien notice 
did not bear the required statutory legend, "showing address where 
delivered." The court ruled the notice sufficient because the 
recipient of the notice stipulated that the notice was delivered to 
the proper address. In Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3rd 552, 
166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980), the court held that 
the statutory three-day notice to quit was sufficient for an 
eviction, even though the contract required five days to cure, 
because the lessee's effectively had 11 days to cure before the 
lessors filed their eviction action. In Midwest Uranium Co. v. 
Craig, 215 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1953), the court held that the 
parties treated verbal notice as substantial compliance with the 
contractual notice requirements. 
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obligated buy to under the contract? Under such circumstances, the 
law should anticipate the possibility that Mr. Busch might wait 
until the very last day to perform the required act. 
D. The Law Should Not Require Speculation as to Whether a 
Buyer Who Receives a Premature Notice of Forfeiture Would 
Have Paid During the Remaining Days of the Cure Period 
"[I]t is well settled that the court may not permit the jury 
to speculate upon the evidence and that a finding of fact cannot be 
based upon surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation." Olsen v. 
Warwood. 255 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1953). If a buyer attempted to 
testify as to what he would have done if he had received the notice 
of forfeiture on time, such testimony would be inadmissible as 
speculative. State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah App. 1996) 
(what a defendant may have done under different circumstances is 
speculative); Cottrell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 863 
P.2d 381, 385 (Mont. 1993) ("speculative testimony is inadmissible 
as evidence"). Consequently, to require a jury or a judge to 
determine whether a buyer would or would not have cured its default 
in the last few days of the cure period had the notice of 
forfeiture been properly delivered would require speculation 
because in every case the jury or judge will lack direct testimony 
as to what the buyer would have done. 
Even if a buyer told a seller, "I absolutely will not cure my 
default" after receiving a notice of default but before receiving 
the notice of forfeiture, the law should require the seller to wait 
until the full cure period has expired before giving the notice of 
forfeiture, because it is a very real possibility that the buyer, 
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who stands to lose its equity in the property, might change its 
mind and pay on the last day. 
In the instant case, Buyer invested over $200,000 of its own 
money in obtaining commercial zoning for the property (Tr. 134:10-
25, 135:1) and thereby increased the property's value at least 
o 
four-fold (and perhaps seven-fold) . Although Mr. Busch testified 
that he did not feel he "owed" the second payment because he had 
been unable to resolve his dispute with Mr. Siggard, he did not 
testify (nor could he) what he would have done had the notice of 
forfeiture not been delivered prematurely. To conclude what he 
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would have done requires speculation. 
Regardless of what the evidence indicated about Mr. Busch's 
state of mind when the second annual installment payment fell due, 
it was not for the jury to speculate as to whether Buyer would or 
would not have paid that installment. The issue for the jury to 
determine was whether Seller gave Buyer its full opportunity to 
cure the default, allowing for the possibility that, Buyer might 
have paid in the last two days to preserve its substantial 
investment and equity in the property. 
See footnote number 1 on page 2, supra. 
9 . . . . 
If speculation is permitted, one could imagine that, if the 
notice of forfeiture had not been delivered prematurely, Mr. Busch 
might have laid in bed the night before the last day to cure, 
thinking, "Even though Mr. Siggard has breached the contract, and 
therefore I don't feel like I should make this payment, I shouldn't 
take the chance of losing my investment in the property, and 
therefore I will make the payment." Of course this is silly, 
because it too is nothing more than speculation. 
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E. Conclusion 
Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and is abhorred by the courts. 
Unlike other remedies, which protect a buyer's equity or give a 
buyer a period of time in which to redeem the property (see Brief 
of Appellant at 16 nn. 4 & 5) , a forfeiture irrevocably terminates 
a buyer's equity interest in the property. Consequently, the 
strict compliance rule should mean what it says: strict (not 
substantial) compliance. The law should require a seller to give 
a buyer the full amount of time in which to cure. When the full 
amount of time is not given, the law should not require speculation 
as to whether a buyer would have paid, but should give the benefit 
of any doubt as to whether a buyer might have paid to the buyer. 
II. The Conclusions that Seller Seeks to Draw from the Facts Are 
Based on Mischaracterizations of Fact and Speculation As to 
What Buyer Would Have Done 
Seller asserts the evidence shows that Buyer "had no 
intention" of paying the second annual installment. This assertion 
finds no direct support in the evidence. Never did any of Buyer's 
representatives, including Mr. Busch, testify that Buyer did not 
intend to pay the second annual installment. The only way Seller 
can make this argument is through factual "inferences," a word 
which Seller uses frequently in its brief. (See Appellees' Brief 
at 1, 22, 27, 31.) 
As has been discussed in the Facts section, supra, several of 
the facts on which Seller bases its inferences are mischaracter-
ized. For example, Buyer's payment of the first annual installment 
was not "delinquent." At the time the first annual installment 
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fell due, the contract had, by its own terms, become void. (The 
parties later amended the contract so as to reinstate it.) Another 
example: Mr. Busch7s testimony that he "could have" paid obviously 
means that he had the financial ability to pay, not that he 
believed (contrary to the forfeiture notice) that he had the legal 
right to pay. 
Furthermore, considering the facts that Seller does not 
mischaracterize, the inferences Seller draws from those facts are 
speculative. Even considering that Buyer failed to pay the $5,000 
down payment; that Buyer attempted to re-negotiate the contract so 
that Seller would not have to make the annual interest payment; 
that Mr. Busch testified he did not make the March 1990 payment 
because of his dispute with Mr. Siggard over the boundary survey, 
etc.; and that Mr. Busch felt he did not "owe" the money, it 
requires serious speculation to conclude that Buyer would not have 
paid in the last two days of the cure period. There was no 
testimony by Mr. Busch as to what he would have done had he been 
given two additional days in which to cure. Indeed, as 
previously argued, had Mr. Busch attempted to so testify, such 
testimony would have been inadmissible as being speculative. 
Cottrell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. . 863 P.2d 381, 385 
(Mont. 1993). 
Even Mr. Busch could not have given an answer—he, too, did 
not know what he might have done had he been given the critical 
last two days of the cure period. He could not predict the future 
any better than anyone else. 
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The jury in this case should not be permitted to speculate as 
to what Buyer would have done. Similarly, this Court should not 
base its decision on such speculation. 
III. Buyer Does Not Seek A Remedy the Jury Rejected 
Seller argues that because the jury found Buyer was not 
entitled to specific performance, Buyer is not entitled to raise on 
appeal the issue of whether Seller's attempted forfeiture complied 
with the contract. Seller asserts that Buyer is seeking "a remedy 
that is indistinguishable from specific performance" and that Buyer 
"is not entitled to relief for a claim it has not appealed." 
(Appellees' Brief at 20.) 
This argument misstates Buyer's appeal. In filing this 
appeal, Buyer is not asserting a new "claim;" rather, Buyer is 
challenging Seller's right to forfeit Buyer's interest under the 
contract. The two are very different. Even if Buyer breached the 
contract and is therefore not entitled to specific performance, 
Seller cannot forfeit Buyer's interest without giving Buyer proper 
notice under the contract. 
The jury, in rejecting specific performance, did not determine 
that Buyer was not entitled to insist that Seller comply with the 
forfeiture provisions of the contract. The instructions to the 
jury regarding specific performance make no mention of the 
forfeiture requirements. The jury was instructed that to find 
Buyer was entitled to specific performance, it must find (1) the 
existence of a valid contract; (2) that Buyer was excused from 
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tendering the second annual installment; (3) that Seller was in 
default of a material obligation under the contract, and (4) that 
Buyer had clean hands in performing its duties under the contract, 
(Jury Instruction 18; R. 993.) As to Seller's "default" under the 
contract, the jury was instructed that Buyer claimed Seller had 
failed to provide a survey. (Jury Instruction 25, R. 1000; see 
also Jury Instruction 35, R. 1009.) The instruction regarding the 
strict compliance rule was wholly separate. (Jury Instruction 38, 
R. 1012.) 
Moreover, the relief that Buyer seeks is very different than 
specific performance. Had Buyer prevailed at trial in its specific 
performance claim, it would have been entitled to an order 
requiring seller to perform all its duties under the contract 
(including the providing of required surveys, etc.) before Buyer 
would be required to make any payments under the contract. In 
contrast, if Buyer prevails on this appeal, it will not be entitled 
to require Seller to provide any surveys or perform any other 
duties under the contract as a condition to Buyer making the 
required contractual payments. The Buyer would simply get two 
additional days in which make the required contractual payments. 
IV. Buyer's Filing of The Notice of Interest Was Not Groundless 
In arguing that the jury's finding of wrongful lien was 
supported by the evidence, Seller does not dispute, and therefore 
concedes, three points from Buyer's initial brief regarding Buyer's 
right to designate its acreage: 
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• Under the contract, Buyer had the right to designate its 
acreage anywhere within the 38-acre parcel, (See 
Appellant's Brief at 24.) 
• The purchase contract did not require designation of 
Buyer's acreage prior to site plan approval by Sandy 
City. (Appellant's Brief at 25.) 
• At no time prior to trial did Sandy City grant site plan 
approval. (Appellant's Brief at 25.) 
Buyer submits that these three points, by themselves, provide 
a sufficient basis for this Court to overturn the jury's finding of 
wrongful lien. If Buyer had the legal right to designate its 
acreage anywhere within the 38 acres, then Buyer also had the right 
to file a lis pendens against the entire 38 acres. 
Seller asserts that because Buyer knew where the commercial 
zone was to be placed, Buyer should have limited its notice of 
interest to that zone. But Seller concedes, and it is undisputed, 
that the commercial zone was only 13 acres (Appellees' Brief at 37, 
f4; Tr. 138-139, 211), and that the total acreage Buyer was 
required to purchase was 16 acres. (Appellees' Brief at 8-9.) 
This leaves three acres outside of the commercial zone that Buyer 
could designate anywhere Buyer wished. 
Regarding these three additional acres, Mr. Busch testified 
that they would not necessarily be contiguous to the boundaries of 
the commercial property. (Tr. 240:13-18, 241:4-8.) As of August 
1989, when Sandy City approved the commercial zoning, he had not 
determined where Buyer would purchase the additional three acres. 
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(Tr. 242:24-25, 243:1-4.) Mr. Busch testified that he was going to 
to make that determination "as soon as we got site plan approval" 
(Tr: 243:3-4), and that he thought about taking the three 
additional acres "on the down side" (meaning on 10th East) or "up 
above" (meaning on 14th South) or "back behind." (Tr. 243:6-17.) 
Seller relies on Bianco v. Patterson, 768 P.2d 204 (Ariz. App. 
1989), as being "very similar to the facts of this case." 
(Appellee,s Brief at 39.) Bianco, however, has a crucial factual 
distinction. The buyer in that case did not have a right to choose 
acreage anywhere within the entire tract. The buyer was entitled 
only to receive back from the seller a quit claim deed "to a 
specified 40-acre parcel of land." Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
Consequently, "[b]y the terms of the [purchase] agreement, and as 
stated in [buyer's] request for relief . . ., only the specified 40 
acres could be the subject of a lis pendens, not all the property 
proposed in the [purchase] agreement." Id. at 206. 
Unlike Bianco. Buyer in this case had a right to designate its 
acreage (and especially the three acres outside the commercial 
zone) anywhere it chose. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should refuse to replace the strict compliance rule 
with a substantial compliance rule, or to permit a seller to 
prematurely forfeit a buyer's rights under a real estate contract 
based on speculation as to what the buyer "would" have done if the 
notice of forfeiture were not premature. Therefore, the jury's 
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verdict should be reversed, and Buyer should be granted its 
requested relief. 
DATED this S day of November, 1996. 
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